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The relationship between skills, effort and workers’ health have attracted the attention 
of the most prestigious economists from the very beginning of the discipline. Adam Smith 
(1776), for example, in the Wealth of Nations stressed that “mutual emulation and the desire of 
greater gain frequently prompted them (workers) to overwork themselves, and to hurt their 
health by excessive labour”.  To control the effect of work effort on health, the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) jointly established that 
the first and foremost objective of the Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) policies should 
be the “maintenance and promotion of workers’ health and working capacity” (ILO, 2013). As 
firms and governments are responsible for OHS activities, they are obliged to protect workers 
and their human capital.  
According to the Chicago School, human capital is the stock of knowledge, and some 
social and personal attributes (Becker, 1962). This stock determines workers’ ability to work, 
and is expected to generate economic value for the organization. It follows that the value of a 
firm’s human capital depends not only on the ‘stock’ variables belonging to each worker, but 
also on workers’ actual capacity to generate economic value, which is determined by, amongst 
other factors, the health status of each worker. The professional sports industry illustrates this: 
expensive star players only contribute to a team’s performance if their health is good enough to 
play. If they are injured or out of shape, their team’s investment in human capital will not obtain 
the expected yield. This means that protecting and maintaining workers’ (players’) health is a 
human resources (HR) priority for professional sports teams; their competitive edge is strongly 
dependent on player health.  
Despite the (allegedly) obvious, important relationship between human capital and 
OHS, the link between investment in OHS and the value of a firm’s human capital has not been 
thoroughly analysed. Colbert (2004) claims that OHS activities have been systematically 
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neglected in analysis of HR functions, which seriously hinders the development and 
implementation of effective OHS policies. Only some studies have analysed the relationship 
indirectly, and which estimated the effect of OHS activities on workers’ productivity (Loeppke 
et al., 2009), or firms’ performance (Fernandez-Muñiz, Montes-Peon, & Vazquez-Ordas, 
2009). Others have analysed the relationship between organizations’ work practices and 
occupational injuries directly (although without considering investment in OHS), including 
studies of high performance work systems (Barling, Kelloway, & Roderick, 2003; Zacharatos, 
Barling, & Iverson, 2005) quality management practices and technological and organisational 
innovations (Harrison & Legendre, 2003).  
For the HRM field, the joint analysis of OHS investment and human capital has the 
potential to generate improved HR policies. MacIntosh, MacLean & Burns (2007), for example, 
stressed that the success in the implementation of some HR practices may be determined by 
workers’ health status.  Warr &  Yearta (1995) analysed how the interaction between motivation 
and health affected absenteeism in workers. More recently, Van de Voorde & Beijer (2015) 
studied how high-performance work systems influenced employee’s outcomes, including 
health. They observed that HR practices may improve work performance if they are associated 
with improvements in health-related variables. Ruiz & Corduras (2015) also investigated how 
certain HR practices contribute to the humanisation of the production process (one consequence 
of which is health improvements) and how these HR practices improve some performance 
indicators such as corporate entrepreneurship and productivity.  
 In this paper, we argue that the relationship described in the sport industry, between 
an organisation’s human capital and the investment in OHS, may also be in force in other 
sectors and firms. Hence, firms with a strong human capital should be more interested in 
investing in OHS to “maintain and promote workers’ health and working capacity” as defined 
by ILO/WHO. We focused our analysis on a sample of 1,474 Spanish manufacturing and 
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construction firms, and where occupational risk is quite high in both industries. OHS activities 
and human capital were measured by responses to the VI Encuesta Nacional de Gestión de la 
Seguridad (ENGE)  survey sponsored by the national body responsible for OHS in Spain, the 
Instituto Nacional de Seguridad e Higiene en el Trabajo (INSHT)1.  
2. Theoretical Conceptualization. Human Capital Investment in OHS. 
The human capital of a firm can be analysed, fundamentally, at two levels: individual and 
organisational. At an individual level, human capital theory was the brainchild of Becker 
(1962), who recognised health and fitness as components of human capital. This perspective 
suggests that firms’ investments in OHS may increase their stock of human capital, as does, for 
example, investment in workers’ training. Individual health thus becomes an intangible asset of 
the firm.  
At the organisational level, which is the focus of our analysis, human capital is the sum 
of the skills and capabilities that a firm employs in the production process (Wright, Coff, & 
Moliterno, 2014). Ployhart and Moliterno (2011) stressed that human capital in this sense is an 
asset that belongs to the firm. Furthermore, as human capital is a productive asset, it should 
contribute to the firms’ production and value, and therefore, enhance its competitive advantage 
(Barney & Wright, 1998). At an organisational level, workers’ health is not usually considered 
a component of human capital. With the exception of a small number of sectors which make 
very specific demands of workers, such as professional sport, it seems unreasonable to suggest 
that the workers’ physical condition can generate a competitive advantage for a normal firm. 
On the contrary, it is quite clear that poor health or accidents and injuries may hinder the 
effective use of workers’ productive skills and capabilities.  
Our theoretical proposition is not that firms invest in OHS to increase their human 
capital, but that they do so to protect it and make it available. In a recent article, Ployhart, 
                                                          
1 National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety.  
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Nyberg, Reilly, & Maltarich (2014) discussed the difference between human capital and human 
capital resources; they stressed that the difference between the constructs is in firms’ level of 
access to their stock of human capital. They argue that traditional human capital components, 
such as knowledge or skills are only significant if they are accessible for a firm relevant 
purposes. On the basis of this distinction we understand firms’ investment in OHS as an 
organisational mechanism by which the stock of human capital embodied in workers is made 
available to firms’ production processes; in other words, investment in OHS may transform 
unproductive human capital into a source of competitive advantage for a firm. 
 If this conceptual approach is accepted, then investments in OHS and, for example, 
training, do not contribute equally to a firm’s human capital. Investment in training may 
increase a firm’s stock of human capital but if the trained workers are not fit for work due to 
accidents or sickness it will not yield any competitive advantage. Firms with large stocks of 
human capital thus have a particularly strong incentive to minimise accidents and sickness 
among their workforce by investing in OHS. 
 The formalisation of the market of OHS first developed by Henderson (1983) may 
help to illustrate the relationship we have proposed. Henderson (1983) assumes that the 
investment in OHS is no different to other decisions made by firms and workers, and therefore 
is informed by cost and benefits functions. Rational firms in a competitive market will therefore 
invest in OHS to the point where marginal costs and revenues are equal. From that starting 
point, economists have tried to identify the components of these functions, with particular 
interest in wage differentials (Viscusi, 1993), inspections and sanctions (Shapiro, 1999) or 
incentives linked to the insurance system (Ruser   & Butler, 2010). In this paper, we argue that 
human capital will depict the form of the OHS benefit function and consequently it will 
determine the level of optimum OHS investment. 
Accordingly, we posit that: 
6 
 
Hypothesis 1: Investment in safety (OHS)  is positively related to human capital stock. 
Based on Ployhart and Moliterno’s (2011) definition of human capital as an organisational 
resource that emerges from individuals’ knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics 
(KSAO) we operationalised Hypothesis 1 as a series of sub-hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: Firms where the workforce is highly knowledgeable will invest more in OHS. 
Hypothesis 1b: Firms where the workforce is highly skilled will invest more in OHS.  
Hypothesis 1c: Investment in OHS is positively related to workers’ abilities.  
3. Method.  
3.1 Data and Sample 
The sample is based on the IX Encuesta Nacional de Gestion de la Seguridad y Salud 
en el Trabajo (ENGE 2009)i, conducted by the Spanish National Institute for Safety and Health 
at Work. The unit of analysis is the firm and the survey collected a unique set of data on OHS 
indicators, management practices and job design parameters. The survey was targeted at 
managers or company owners with at least one registered worker in the social security system. 
The population comprises 1,120,276 units and comprises companies in all sectors throughout 
Spain (except Ceuta and Melilla). The random sample survey included a total of 5,147 firms.  
In our analysis we limited the sample to the construction and manufacturing industries, 
where the level of occupational risk is higher and easier to measure. We excluded the service 
industries because the occupational risk in this sector is close to p≈0, and in such cases the 
influence of the quantity of human capital on investment in OHS will be very small, and 
therefore difficult to estimate empirically. Finally, we restricted the sample to firms with ten or 
more employees to ensure that we only considered firms with a developed HR function and 
OHS management system. The resulting sample consisted of 1,472 firms; descriptive statistics 
for the sample are listed in Table 1. 




3.2. Dependent Variable 
We measured investment in OHS using a specially developed additive index of nine 
measures which have been or have not been implemented by a firm. The index is an ordinal 
measure of overall investment in OHS, which would, ideally, be measured in monetary units; 
however this information was not available from this survey. Furthermore, the lack of 
accounting standards for the costs and revenues of OHS is a widespread problem which affects 
not only surveys, but more importantly, OHS practitioners and firms. In most national 
accounting systems, OHS costs and revenues are reported under different accounting items, 
which dramatically reduces the visibility of OHS performance (Rikhardsson & Impgaard, 
2004).  
We opted to construct an ordinal index of OHS investment as an alternative to a direct 
monetary indicator based on the assumption that firms implementing a given OHS measure are 
investing more in OHS than they would if they did not implement that measure. It is important 
to note that because we used an ordinal construct we cannot compare OHS investment between 
firms. For example, if firms A and B both score 2 this does not mean that they are investing the 
same amount of resources in OHS. This limitation is particularly important when, as is the case 
in practice, there are differences in the resources needed to implement particular OHS measures. 
For example, it may be more expensive to ensure that all employees undergo a specific medical 
examination than assigning OHS responsibilities.  
To measure the internal robustness of the additive index,  we used  Cronbach’s Alpha. 
We used the usual threshold of values over (λ=.70) to accept that the additive index is measuring 
the same construct. The internal robustness of the index was very good (λ=.83), and we found 
that, on average, firms implement 6.29 measures out of 9. As expected, basic measures such as 
development of an OHS plan (86.4%) or planning OHS activities (81.4%) are more widely 
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implemented than more specific measures such as medical examinations (42.7%) or simulated 
emergencies (52.3%). It is important to note, however, that firms have a legal duty to implement 
most of these measures, and so what appears to be high implementation frequencies actually 
indicates that firms are not complying with the law quite frequently. We deliberately excluded 
OHS training activities from our OHS investment index as some human capital variables 
include training and we wanted to avoid the risk that we would be measuring the same factor 
as a dependent and independent variable.  
3.3. Independent Variables.  
As explained above, we determined firms’ stock of human capital by measuring the 
KSAO embedded in their workforce. In this analysis, we will focus on the stock of Knowledge, 
Skills and Abilities, as it is difficult to define and measure what is embedded in the more generic 
Other dimension. The unit of analysis is the firm, and therefore frequencies in Table 1 show the 
percentage of firms implementing each preventive or organizational practice. 
First, we tested Hypothesis 1a, by estimating knowledge based on the scope and content 
of firms’ training activities. We simply assumed that the stock of knowledge is higher in firms 
where more workers receive training (greater scope) and where training is delivered more 
frequently, because “knowledge contained in any given process is proportionate to the time it 
takes to learn it” ( Pavlou et al., 2005).  We observed that on average firms provide training for 
3.06 out of 5 worker categories and the category least likely to receive training was outsourced 
staff, as only 28.0% of the firms in the sample provide training to this group. Inspection of data 
on training frequency also showed that firms are most likely to provide training when hiring 
new staff (50.7%) and when improvement programmes are introduced (64.3%). Finally, to 
control for the source of training, distinguishing between internal and more specific training, 
and external and more generic training, we include a dummy variable that identifies firms 
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(30,6%) that provide training by using external institutions such as universities, unions or 
consulting firms. 
To test the next two sub-hypotheses we introduced a set of variables measuring skills 
and abilities. Unfortunately, it is not always easy to distinguish and separately measure workers’ 
skills and abilities. This is even more complicated when the unit of measure is the firm and not 
the individual worker, as in our case, and also the case of many of previous studies on human 
capital (Wright & McMahan, 2011). 
The following measures are therefore proposed in order to approach the stock of skills 
and abilities embedded in the firm, but do not attempt to provide a clear cut differentiation 
between skills and abilities. As we are aware that some readers may understand skills and 
abilities differently in the proposed classification. Nevertheless, we understand that they are 
adequate measures for our analysis, as they are clearly and positively related to firms’ average 
stock of human capital.  
To test Hypothesis 1b, we used a set of variables measuring the skill mix of firms: 
frequency of multi-skilling (58.6%) and the percentage (12.8%) of firms that are strong in new 
technologies. We assumed that firms where workers have multiple skills and firms where new 
technologies are introduced have a richer skill mix among their workforce and therefore have 
more incentive to protect their workers by investing more resources in OHS. We also include a 
dichotomic variable identifying firms where the design of new products is among the two major 
strategic goals (20,8%). Leornard-Barton (1992) identifies some core technical and managerial 
skills or capabilities that are key to the development of new products. In our analysis, we simply 
expect that these design-oriented firms will need to incorporate these skills and, as a result, their 
stock of human capital will be larger.  
 Third, to test Hypothesis 1c, we introduced two variables, workforce ability to solve 
problems (45.1%) and a dichotomic variable that identifies firms (5.4%) where innovation is 
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among their strategic priorities. Sullivan and Ford (2010) stress that innovation is linked to 
some personal abilities or attributes broadly embodied in the concept of creativity. We expect 
that these innovative firms will also have a more creative workforce, making their stock of 
human capital higher.  
Finally, we included some control variables in order to gauge the level of occupational 
risk in firms. First, we created a risk index based on respondents’ assessments of firms’ OHS 
risk. In particular, the respondents assessed the risk of accidents, occupational diseases and 
special activities that involve high risk. We also included the industry and size of the firm in 
order to control structural and institutional characteristics of the firm. This sample was mainly 
composed of firms in the manufacturing industry (81.5%) and medium sized firms (133.70 
employees). Finally, we included past administrative sanctions (15.1%) and surcharges in the 
social security fees (7.3%) paid by firms in order to control the effect of the enforcement of 
OHS regulations.  
4. Results 
4.1. The Ordered Probit Model. 
Human capital variables are usually correlated and therefore multicollinearity becomes 
an important methodological issue when their relationship is econometrically analysed 
(Heckman & Vytlacil, 1998). Lack of independence between human capital variables is quite 
common as, for example, individual knowledge may be the origin of personal skills, or the 
result of the ability to learn. First, in order to identify possible multicollinearity problems, in 
Table 2, we computed the pairwise Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the explanatory 
variables.  
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
As expected, this revealed that most variables were positively related. However, in most 
cases the level of correlation was reasonably low. Some additional tests such as the Variance 
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Inflation Factor (VIF) confirm that the multicollinearity problem was not grave enough to bias 
the estimations.  
We defined the following model to estimate the relationship between investment in OHS 
and the stock of human capital. The first model is specified in Equation [1] and is estimated by 
means of an Ordered Probit regression. In order to avoid possible heteroscedasticity bias, we 
used the robust errors option available in STATA 14.  
Model 1 
 =	 +	 +			 + 

 +	 +	 +	 +		 +	 +	 +
	 +	 + 		 + 

 +  																		1  
The direct effects are listed in Table 3.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
The results provide strong support for Hypothesis 1. There is an association between 
human capital stock and investment in OHS. In particular, Hypothesis 1a is supported by the 
coefficients of training scope (β=.177, ρ=.000) and frequency (β=.126, ρ=.000), both strongly 
significant coefficients. In line with our theoretical proposal, the results show that when firms 
have enhanced their human capital through training, they protect it by devoting more resources 
to OHS. The results also reveal that the external source of training does not affect the investment 
in OHS. In other words, both specific and generic human capital gains are equally protected by 
firms’ investment in OHS. 
The results also provide support for Hypothesis 1b: there was strong evidence that the 
multi-skilling dimension of human capital (β=.276, ρ=.000) influenced investment in OHS. 
However, we find no evidence that investment in OHS was related to the need for technological 
skills, or to design skills. As we will discuss further, these results may indicate that firms in the 
sample do not consider these skills of strategic value or, alternatively, they find it easy to replace 
these types of skills using external markets.   
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We also found support for Hypothesis 1c, as coefficients for abilities linked to 
innovation (β=.220, ρ=.052) and problem-solving (β=.235, ρ=.000) were positive and 
significant. The results reveal that firms find it necessary to protect their workforce more 
intensely when their employees have these particular and quite rare abilities. Finally, we 
obtained the expected results for the control variables; all coefficients were positive and 
significant: risk index (β=.083, ρ=.001), industry dummy (β=.252, ρ=.001), company size 
(β=.087,ρ=.001) and administrative sanctions (β=.384, ρ=.000). 
 
4.2. Analysing the endogeneity problem. 
 The rigorousness of the results presented above are based on the assumption of a 
unidirectional relationship between human capital stock and investment in OHS. However, this 
relationship may work the other way around leading to a classical endogeneity problem where 
the stock of human capital may be explained by the OHS investment. In particular, it can be 
argued that skilled workers may prefer safer firms as suffering an accident or illness may be 
more costly for them in terms of the loss of the opportunity to develop their (more optimistic) 
careers. The wage premium theory precisely stresses that workers will be sorted in firms 
according to their preferences between risk or wage (Viscusi, 1993), and therefore it is likely 
that the workforce of safer firms will be composed of workers with better career prospects or, 
in other words, workers with higher human capital stock. 
 The Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation models are the common solution to 
endogeneity problems. The IV models are estimated in two stages. In the first-stage, the 
endogenous variables (human capital variables) are used as dependent variables and the 
Instrumental Variables are used as explanatory variables. In the second stage, the dependent 
variable (OHS investment) is regressed against the predicted values of the endogenous variables 
estimated in the first-stage regression. IV models have to comply with two conditions in order 
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to become valid and robust estimators. First, IV variables have to significantly relate to the 
endogenous variables and, as a second condition, they should remain unrelated to the dependent 
variable (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
 Finding adequate instruments is a difficult task, particularly when the model contains 
multiple endogenous variables. In our case, we needed eight instruments for the equivalent 
number of endogenous variables. In order to estimate our model, we used several official 
regional educational and health indicators listed in Table 4 as instrumental variables. The 
relationship of early education and health with future human capital is straightforward and well 
documented in the literature (Schulz, 1961) and therefore these variables will observe the first 
condition. Regarding the second condition, it seems quite reasonable to think that variables such 
as the number of students per teacher or the per capita expenditure on education will not inform 
a firm’s private decision to invest in OHS. Hence, only through the effect of human capital, 
may these educational variables affect OHS. 
 It is also worth to stating that the educational and health variables are obtained for 
each Spanish autonomous region and not for each firm. We understand that this is not a problem 
as the education in Spain is a fully decentralized system where each autonomous region decides 
key variables such as investment in education, per teacher ratios or teaching methodologies. 
This decentralized system does create strong differences in the performance of the educational 
system, and indicators such as the PISA scores by region, for example, are notably different 
(Economic and Social Council of Spain, 2009). Furthermore, the Spanish labour market is also 
characterized by its geographical rigidity (Huber, 2004) and therefore is very likely that workers 
educated (differently) in each regional system will also be employed in the same region. We 




In Table 4 we list the coefficients obtained for the IV models in each of the eight first stage 
equations.  
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
Briefly, we observe that IV are, in general, significantly related to the endogenous variables. 
We also find a better fit with knowledge and skills variables where most of the instruments are 
positively and significantly related. Not surprisingly, the fit of the instrumental variables with 
the abilities variables is not that good, as these are understood to be more innate (less 
educational) attributes. In any case, the PISA score in science is related for the case of problem 
solving and innovation and, for the former, some other good instruments are also found. The 
results of the first-stage equation suggest that the proposed IV model provides a reasonable 
control for the alleged endogeneity bias. 
As we explained above, our dependent variable is an Ordinal variable with nine possible levels 
of OHS investment. The estimation of Ordered Probit models with eight instrumental variables 
is an econometric challenge, as the main econometric packages do not offer the option to 
estimate Instrumental Variables in non-linear models. In order to provide some robust 
estimates, in the first column of Table 5, we list the results obtained with STATA 14, assuming 
that our dependent variable is normally distributed. It is important to acknowledge that our 
dependent Ordinal variable has nine categories and therefore it quite closely represents the 
continuous and normally distributed latent variable (i.e OHS investment in euros).  
In order to improve the robustness of our results, we also applied a two-step procedure proposed 
by Sajaia (2008) in which we estimate the eight predicted values of the instrumental variables 
listed in Table 4, and then, we use these variables as independent variables in the structural 
Ordered Probit model. Results are shown in the second column of Table 5, and they are quite 
similar to results obtained assuming normality. In any case, in order to ensure that our 
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Hypothesis are empirically supported, we have only considered the coefficients that are 
significant in both models.  
Table 5 shows the results for the structural equation where coefficients are estimated once the 
endogeneity is controlled by the IV model in the first-stage regression. Results in Table 5 will 
therefore capture the unidirectional relationship between human capital and firms’ decision to 
invest in OHS.   
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
.  
 We find that results for training scope (β=1.29,ρ=.010), multi-skilling 
(β=10.5,ρ=.053) and innovation (β=3.72,ρ=.048) are positive and significant and therefore we 
can confirm the hypothesis above. These results suggest that, regardless of the preferences and 
behaviours of skilled workers, firms do increase their investment in OHS when training is 
extended to more types of workers, when the workforce provide a multiple and diverse of set 
of skills and, finally, when workers provide some abilities and attitudes linked to innovation. 
 The main difference between the Ordered probit model Table 3 and the IV models in 
Table 5 is the results obtained for the problem solving ability. In Table 3, the coefficient was 
positive and significant while, once endogenity is controlled, the problem-solving ability 
becomes non-significant. The problem-solving ability is a mainly innate characteristic and 
therefore may be easier to be observed by the worker than by the firm. In the case of un-
observability or asymmetric information, firms will not be able to incorporate the information 
regarding the value of their problem-solving asset to the decision on OHS investment. The 
results obtained in the linear model will therefore be clearly endogenous, as only the preference 
of workers with this ability for safer firms may explain the estimated positive relationship.  
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 We also found some differences between the Ordered Probit model and the IV models 
regarding training frequency. In particular, the coefficient changes from significant (β=.126, 
ρ=.000) to non-significant (β=.241, ρ=.812). This result may suggest that, as stressed by 
Acemoglu and Pischke, (1999), highly skilled workers may select jobs offering intensive 
training programs. The positive relationship between human capital and safety investment 
estimated in the Ordered Logit model may not be related to firms’ decision to invest in OHS, 
and therefore disappears when endogeneity is controlled. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions. 
In this paper we have shown that firms’ human capital stock and their decisions about 
investment in OHS are positively related. We argued and demonstrated empirically that firms 
protect their human capital by investing in OHS resources. We believe that this analysis opens 
up some interesting avenues for further research into HR management, particularly in relation 
to clarifying what the core HR activities should be and for the better integration of the OHS 
management in the firms’ decision making process. 
This paper broadly contributes to the human capital field of study in the following form: 
First, it shows that firms are not only devoted to hiring or creating human capital, as previous 
literature has extensively studied, but are also worried about protecting human capital assets. 
Our empirical analysis, therefore, reinforces the idea of human capital resources stressed by 
Ployhart et al (2014) where the emphasis is made in the level of access (or availability) to  
human capital, rather than in the stock. Second, our paper also shows that firms do not protect 
the components of human capital equally, suggesting that human capital is also managed 
strategically. In particular, we find that firms are mostly interested in protecting the human 
capital components that are rare (innovation) or difficult to replace (multi-skilling). Finally, our 
analysis on endogeneity suggests that some informational asymmetries between firms and 
workers may lead to some non-efficient investment decisions. It may be the case of innate 
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abilities such as problem-solving that appears to be correlated to OHS investment only by 
workers’ choice of safe firms.  
We draw the following conclusions from our results. First, there is a clear relationship 
between firms’ investment in the internal creation of human capital (training) and their 
investment in OHS. This is particularly important given that training is part of the HR function 
and therefore is specifically and internally designed by firms. Other HR factors such as skills 
or abilities, for example, can be obtained by hiring from the external market and are therefore 
affected by informational asymmetries (Lazear and Gibbs, 2015). Furthermore, our analysis of 
endogeneity reveals that some valuable abilities such as problem-solving may be observed by 
workers but remain unnoticed by the firm. This evidence gives even more relevance to the long-
term issue of human capital signalling. Our study suggests that skills that are easier to be 
signalled such as formal education or training may induce firms to over-invest in safety. On the 
contrary, less visible abilities such as problem-solving or creativity may not be optimally 
protected.  
Second, our results show that the flexibility and adaptability associated with multi-
skilling are valued more than purely technical skills. It should be noted that this finding may 
only apply to the Spanish labour market, whose rigidity and low mobility are partly responsible 
for the high rates of unemployment (Dolado & Jimeno, 1997). Workers in Spain tend to spend 
long periods of their working life working for a single firm and to specialise in certain roles and 
tasks. This ability is dependent on the versatility of the workforce; having workers who can 
perform tasks in several different production processes reduces the costs of direct and indirect 
recruitment (Gomar, Haas, & Morton, 2002). In short, workers who offer a variety of skills are 
difficult to replace, and therefore valuable to the firms.  
In this sense, besides traditional human capital variables (i.e. knowledge and training), 
our results are in line with some authors that claim that the true competitive advantage lies in 
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some social and organisational competences such as the autonomy to take decisions and the 
capability of sharing such decisions with the organisations (Wright, Dunford, & Snell, 2001). 
Ployhart et al (2014) stress that competitive advantage depends precisely  on human capital 
resources at the unit level. This capital is formed by a unique and complex combination or 
interrelation of individual skills and capabilities that are observed at firm or departmental level. 
For a normal firm, incentives will therefore lie in the protection of the “workforce” rather than 
the protection of “star workers”. Furthermore, these organisational and social capabilities are, 
in general, specific to a particular organisational context as they depend on mutual trust and 
organisational compromise (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998); they may not be 
available in external labour markets and, therefore strong incentives to protect this intangible 
asset will arise.  
In contrast, we found that some elements of KSAO are not rewarded with increased 
investment in OHS, for example, neither technical nor technological skills were positively 
related to the OHS index. There are two possible reasons for this, which are consistent with our 
theoretical perspective: (i) technical skills do not have a strategic value for firms and (ii) 
workers with these skills are easy to replace from external labour markets. Although we do not 
rule out the first possibility, the second seems more plausible if the particularities of the Spanish 
labour market are taken into consideration. In the recent decades, the number of moderately and 
highly educated workers in Spain has increased; however, despite this strong transformation, 
changes towards an economy based on advanced technologies are slow. Traditional industries, 
such as the construction industry, are still reliant on physical and manual work. In some senses 
Spain has become a paradigmatic example of what happens when the workforce is overeducated 
(Garcia-Mainar, Garcia-Martin, & Montuenga, 2014): many educated workers are driven to 
accept low-skill jobs in order to avoid unemployment or even emigration.  
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As explained above, one of the most important objectives of our paper is to show that 
firms’ investment in OHS do respond to incentives, and therefore, in some circumstances, the 
administration may not need to spend vast public resources on the enforcement of occupational 
safety legislation. However, our results also show that, sometimes, firms fail to observe the real 
value of their human capital and therefore their investment in OSH may be suboptimal. 
Furthermore, some firms may not possess or need a large stock of human capital and therefore 
their incentives to invest in OSH may be weak. This is the case of firms where workers perform 
simple and routine tasks, and therefore their workforce is low skilled and easy to replace. In 
these firms, incentives to protect workers will be lower and the administration should intervene 
to guarantee workers’ safety.  
The results of this study also offer insights which may be of interest to those seeking to 
improve the management of OHS. First, our findings are consistent with a statement by the 
European Commission-funded European Network for Workplace Health Promotion in the 
Luxemburg Declaration (ENWHP,1997, p. 3) that “the future success of organisations is 
dependent on having well-qualified, motivated and healthy employees”, and its efforts to 
encourage firms’ to include OHS policy in their corporate strategy. The strategic importance of 
OHS was also emphasised in the Barcelona Declaration (ENWHP, 2002, p. 2) which stated that 
“good workplace health practice is a driver for social and economic success in Europe. The 
‘business case’ for investment in workplace health promotion has been understood by 
successful organisations”. .New models of management based on the principle that ‘healthy 
companies are made up of healthy workers’ are gaining traction in the current economic 
climate, in which different norms, standards and certification schemes are being developed and 
promoted by different organisations in different parts of the world”.  
i National Survey on Health and Safety Management 
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σ ENGE Question 
Sample 1.472   
Dependent Variable.    
OHS Index. (y1) 6.29 (.8354) 2.586 
ENGE 39. Indicate if these OHS activities have 
been carried out in your firm: 
Development 86.4%  Development of an OHS plan. 
Planning 81.4%  Planning of the OHS activities. 
Control 67.7%  OHS control activities. 
Emergency 74.9%  Definition of emergency measures. 
Simulacrum 52.3%  Dealing with simulated emergencies 
Information 83.4%  Provision of OHS information 
Investigation 75.0%  Accident investigation and analysis 
Responsibilities 65.8%  Assignment of OHS responsibilities 
Specific medical 
examination 42.7% 
 ENGE 36. Indicate if  your company has offered 
workers the opportunity to undergo medical 
examinations in the last year 
Independent Variable    
Knowledge     
Training Scope (x1) 
3.06 
(.7934) 1.678 
ENGE 42. Indicate the groups have received 
training 
Workers with OHS-
related duties 70.2% 
 Workers with specific OHS-related duties 
Directors  59.9%  Senior management or directors 
Middle managers 67.9%  Direct and intermediate line managers 
Other workers 80.0%  Other employees 
Out-sourced staff  28.0%  External employees 
Training Frequency (x2) 
2.75 
(.7805) 2.350 ENGE 43. Indicate the reasons for training  
New workers 50.7%  Hiring new workers 
OHS functions  29.4%  Assigning OHS functions to certain workers 
Changing roles 21.9%  The change in the functions performed by the 
worker 
New technologies 19.3%  The introduction of new technologies 
Work equipment 18.9%  A change in work equipment 
Demands 16.2%  Demands for workers or their representatives 
Identification of hazards 34.8%  Hazard identification and risk assessment 
Investigation 20.2% 
 
Investigation of occupational accidents and 
diseases 
Improvement 64.3%  The general improvement in OHS training 








   




ENGE 45. Indicate what percentage of your 
companies purchases of machinery (excluding 
computers) have been new machinery during the 
past two years. 
Design (x6) 20.8%  ENGE 12.  Sort these factors according to your 
company´s business strategy. 
Abilities     
Innovation (x7) 5.4%  ENGE 12.  Sort these factors according to your 
company´s business strategy. 
Problem-solving (x8) 45.1%  ENGE 13. Indicate if these management tools have been used in your firm 
Control Variables    
Risk Index (x9) 
0.85 
(.776) 1.215 
ENGE 11 Indicate if your firm carries out 
particularly dangerous activities 
ENGE 15. Indicate if there is a risk of workplace 
accidents, occupational diseases, or other diseases 
or disorders related to work 
Industry (x10) 81.5%  ENGE 4. The main economic activity of the 
company in the workplace.  [Manufacturing] 
Company size (x11) 133.70 1.335 
ENGE 6. Indicate the number of people your firm 
employs at present 
Administrative Sanctions 
(x12) 15.1%  ENGE 16. Indicate if your company has had any: 
Social Security Surcharges 





Pairwise Pearson’s correlations for explanatory variables. 
Correlations 
(Significance level) 
Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Training  
Scope 
 1.000             
              
2. Training 
Frequency 
 .559** 1.000            
 (.000)             
3. External Training  .299** .503** 1.000           
 (.000) (.000)            
4. Multi-skilling  .169** .160** .097** 1.000          
 (.000) (.000) (.000)           
5. High technology  .098** .169** .153** .095** 1.000         
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)          
6. Design  -.074** .090** -0.027 -.035 -.010 1.000        
 (.004) (.001) (.293) (.184) (.689)         
7. Innovation  .079** .062* .025 .060* .017 .034 1.000       
 (.002) (.018) (.334) (.022) (.508) (.192)        
8. Problem-solving  .157** .154** .059* .325** .013 -.040 .057* 1.000      
 (.000) (.000) (.023) (.000) (.616) (.121) (.030)       
9. Risk Index  .221** .300** .191** .088** .106** .118** .031 .084** 1.000     
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.236) (.001)      
10. Industry   -.041 -.018 -.041 .083** .004 .037 .059* .087** 206** 1.000    
 (.114) (.494) (.114) (.001) (.882) (.087) (.024) (.001) (.000)     
11. Ln Company 
Size 
 .354** .477** .336** .170** .111** .014 .058* .233** .188** .091** 1.000   
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.591) (.026) (.000) (.000) (.000)    
12. Administrative 
sanctions  
 .176** .301** .238** .113** .105** -.058* .000 0.051 .158** -.058* .231** 1.000  
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.027) (.992) (.050) (.000) (.027) (.000)   
13. Surcharges  .166** .250** .189** .119** .120** -.066* -.009 .093** .150** -.015 .204** .378** 1.000 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.011) (.741) (.000) (.000) (.565) (.000) (.000)  
 
 **. The correlation is significant at the .01 level (bilateral). 






Table 3.  







 Robust Standard Errors 
Independent Variable  Beta   Errors  p 
Knowledge        
Training Scope   .177   .020 .000 
Training Frequency  .126   .017 .000 
External Training   .039   .071 .577 
Skills        
Multi-skilling  .276   .059 .000 
High technology  .018   .083 .827 
Design  -.039   .069 .573 
Abilities        
Innovation  .220   .113 .052 
Problem-solving  .235   .058 .000 
Risk Index  .083   .024 .001 
Industry  .252   .074 ..001 
Ln  Company size  .087   .025 .001 
Administrative sanctions  .384   .090 .000 
Surchages  -.101   .122 .405 
Cut (0)  -1.205   .296 .000 
Cut (1)  -.609   .289 .035 
Cut (2)  -.119   .286 .172 
Cut (3)  .209   .285 .535 
Cut (4)  .656   .285 .021 
Cut (5)  1.201   .286 .000 
Cut (6)  1.792   .286 .000 
Cut (7)  2.627   .286 .000 




















Technology Design Innovation 
Problem 
Solving 




















Primary Schooling rate 85.23 

































































































































 **. The correlation is significant at the .01 level. 
 *. The correlation is significant at the .05 level. 
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Table 5.Structural equation of the analysis of OHS investment with endogenous covariates. 
 
 
Independent Variable Normal distribution Ordinal Distribution 
Knowledge    
Training Scope  1.29** .411*** 
 [.505] [.053] 
Training Frequency .241 .409*** 
 [2.00] [.057] 
External Training  -2.93 .007 
 [12.3] [.051] 
Skills    
Multi-skilling 10.5* .172*** 
 [5.22] [.049] 
High technology -11.4 -.005 
 [8.26] [.048] 
Design -4.70 -.017 
 [3.24] [.047] 
Abilities    
Innovation 3.72** .193*** 
 [1.68] [.049] 
Problem-solving -15.01 .054 
 [19.7] [.048] 
Risk Index .634*** .302*** 
 [.016] [.042] 
Industry .315*** .463*** 
 [.074] [.124] 
Ln Company size .738*** .466*** 
 [.025] [.039] 
Administrative sanctions .180 .945*** 
 [.326] [.150] 
Surchages 1.61 -.166 
 [3.34] [.205] 
Constant .878  
 [.028]  
Cut (0)  -2.418*** 
  [.288] 
Cut (1)  -1.835*** 
  [.279] 
Cut (2)  -1.358*** 
  [.275] 
Cut (3)  -.604** 
  [.272] 
Cut (4)  -.077 
  [.272] 
Cut (5)  .491* 
  [.272] 
Cut (6)  1.300*** 
  [.274] 
Cut(7)  2.964*** 
  [.282] 
Cut (8)  4.321 
  [.286] 
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